中国农村公共投资的准商业供给模式评价——以电力电话投资为例

利用来自全国6个省2 459个村的代表性的公共投资调查数据,对中国村级电力电话投资的准商业模式进行了评价研究。实证分析表明,作为利润最大化的单位,准商业企业对农村进行投资的策略,与政府实施农村公共投资(如道路等)的有所不同。如果没有政府管制,准商业化经营的电力电话公司在贫困的和地处山区的村庄的投资要少于在富裕的或平原地区的村庄。研究也发现,村庄拥有的关系网对村庄能获得的政府投资具有显著的正效应,但是对准商业模式供给的电力电话投资并不具有显著的效应。文章的结论主要是,在进行适当政府管制的前提下,准商业企业可以纠正自己的行为,从而在农村公共投资中采取更加减贫的策略。若此,准商业供给模式将可以在未来的中国农村公共投资中发挥更加重要的作用。

Connecting Rural China:Public Investment Record of Quasi-commercial Electricity and Telephone Agencies in China's Villages

Using a nationally representative public investment dataset collected from 2 459 villages in 6 provinces,the paper focuses mainly on the public investment record of quasi-commercial electricity and telephone agencies in China's villages.The empirical results show that as a profit maximization unit,quasi-commercial enterprises' investment strategy is some what different from public investment.If no government strains,quasi-commercial enterprises invest less in poor and mountainous villages with regards to electricity and telephone projects.However,although informal connection(Gtuinxi)is very important in getting public projects funded by public organizations,it does not work in quasi-commercial enterprises' decision process when implementing the electricity and telephone projects.The chief conclusion of the paper is that with some government strains attached,the quasi-commercial enterprises could correct their behavior by adopting a more pro poor approach.If it is true,then the quasi-commercial enterprises will be an important and effective complement funding sources for the public projects in rural china' villages in the future.