| 扶贫资金监察的进化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 余孝军.扶贫资金监察的进化博弈分析[J].安徽农业科学,2010,38(30):17271-17274. |
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| 作者姓名： | 余孝军 |
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| 作者单位： | 贵州财经学院数学与统计学院;贵州省经济系统仿真重点实验室; |
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| 摘 要： | 运用进化博弈理论研究扶贫资金监察问题,建立了扶贫资金监察问题的博弈模型,分析了地方官员和中央政府之间的行为选择,得到了各个博弈方的复制动态方程,探讨了博弈模型在不同情形下的进化稳定策略。研究结果表明,地方官员和中央政府在有限理性基础上得到的进化稳定策略与博弈双方的收益、系统所处的初始状态有关,并根据所提出的博弈模型,提出了一些减少扶贫资金使用低效性的合理性建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 扶贫资金 监察 进化博弈 复制动态方程 进化稳定策略 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Supervision of Anti-poverty Capital |
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| YU Xiao-jun.Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Supervision of Anti-poverty Capital[J].Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences,2010,38(30):17271-17274. |
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| Authors: | YU Xiao-jun |
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| Institution: | YU Xiao-jun (School of Mathematics and Statistics,Guizhou College of Finance and Economics,Guiyang,Guizhou 550004) |
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| Abstract: | An anti-poverty capital supervision game model is formulated by using the evolutionary game theory. The behavior choice between the local official and the central government is analyzed. The duplicative dynamic equation of each player in this game is obtained and the evolutionary stable strategy of this game model in different circumstances is investigated. It is showed that the evolutionary stable strategy of the local official and the central government based on bounded rationality,depend on the payoff of... |
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| Keywords: | Anti-poverty captial Supervision Evolutionary game Duplicative dynamic equation Evolutionary Stable strategy |
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