| 古村落保护与开发中参与主体的进化博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 李仙娥,潘莹,相里宝宝.古村落保护与开发中参与主体的进化博弈分析[J].安徽农业科学,2012(13):7974-7975,7998. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李仙娥 潘莹 相里宝宝 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安建筑科技大学管理学院,陕西西安,710055 |
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| 基金项目： | 中国经济改革实施技术援助，陕西省高校哲学社会科学特色学科建设项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 利用进化博弈的复制动态方法构建进化博弈模型,从理论上分析了古村落保护和开发中村委和外来方的策略选择问题。结果表明,双方最终选择合作策略不仅取决于系统的初始状态,还受到外部因素的决定性影响。只有通过建立利益共享和风险共担机制,完善古村落法律法规建设,加强政府监督职能来改善外部环境,才能促使双方进行合作,共同对古村落进行保护和开发。
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| 关 键 词： | 进化博弈 古村落 合作 |
Participants in the Protection and Development of Ancient Villages |
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| Institution: | LI Xian-e et al(School of Management,Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi’an,Shaanxi 710055) |
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| Abstract: | An evolutionary game model was constructed with the replicated dynamic method to analyze the strategic choice of village committee and investor during the protection and development of ancient villages.The results showed that the cooperation between the two parties was determined by not only the initial state of system,but also the external factors.Only by establishing an interests-sharing and risk-sharing mechanism,improving the laws and regulations,and strengthening the governmental supervision to improve the external environment can the two sides achieve cooperation as soon as possible and work together for the protection and development of ancient villages. |
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| Keywords: | Evolutionary game Ancient village Cooperation |
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