| 退耕还林中地方政府执行行为的演化博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 张颖慧.退耕还林中地方政府执行行为的演化博弈[J].安徽农业科学,2008,36(8):3190-3192. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张颖慧 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安石油大学经管学院,陕西,西安,710065 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过建立演化博弈模型,证明了退耕还林工程执行中地方政府行为策略演化稳定的结果,提出了提升生态林木价值,增加执行收益,适度制裁等提高退耕还林工程绩效的举措。
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| 关 键 词： | 退耕还林 地方政府 演化博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 0517-6611(2008)08-03190-02 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年12月21 |
Evolvement Game on Implementation of Local Government in Cropland Conversion |
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| ZHANG Ying-hui.Evolvement Game on Implementation of Local Government in Cropland Conversion[J].Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences,2008,36(8):3190-3192. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Ying-hui |
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| Abstract: | Though evolutionary game models, the evolutionary stable equilibrium on implementation of local government in the cropland conversion was deduced. A serial of public policy were put forward, including promoting the values of ecology-based forestry, enhancing the payoffs of active implementation and reasonable sanction. |
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| Keywords: | Cropland Conversion Local government Evolutionary game |
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