中央政府和地方政府关于耕地保护的利益关系博弈

文章首先阐述了农村耕地保护困境的现状，并在设定理论框架和假设条件的基础上，通过建立博弈模型来寻求中央政府和地方政府的利益博弈的症结．并依据模型来探索地方政府为寻求自身利益与中央政府进行耕地利益博弈的能力所在，从而为当前的耕地保护难题提供建议。

Interest Relationships Game of Farmland Protection between Center Government and Local Government

In this paper,we first expounded on the status of the rural farmland protection,and then we established the model of the central and local governments through some theoretical framework and assumptions.On this basis,we also founded the ability of the local governments seeking to explore their own interests.Finally we gave some detailed proposals to the current problems of the farmland protection.