村主任激励机制对农民收入的影响——基于公共投资的中介效应

通过有效的机制激励基层村干部带领农民致富,是实现乡村振兴战略中"生活富裕"的重要措施。基于激励理论,利用2004—2018年具有全国代表性的村级数据,运用面板数据固定效应模型,分析村主任激励机制对农民收入的影响,探讨公共投资的中介效应。结果表明,村主任年薪酬水平逐年上升,从2004年的5 500.55元增长到2018年的26 480.49元,年薪酬与考核指标挂钩、以发展经济为最重要的考核指标和完不成最重要考核指标而扣10%或更多薪酬的比例均呈现下降趋势。村人均纯收入保持稳步增长,从2004年的3 735.71元增长到2018年的12 020.34元,但是各地区增长不平衡,江苏省代表的东部沿海发达地区的农民收入水平远高于其他地区。年薪酬和最重要的考核指标对人均纯收入有显著影响;年薪酬通过村集体参与出资的公共投资额来影响人均纯收入。因此,提出了设置合理的村主任考核指标、增加经济欠发达村庄的村主任薪酬和公共投资规模的对策建议。

The influences of incentive mechanism of village committee head on the income growth of rural residents: Based on the mediating effects of public investment

Establishing an effective incentive mechanism for grass-roots village officials to encourage them to lead income growth for rural residents is an important measure to realize the rural revitalization strategy. Based on the incentive theory and a panel data of representative villages from 2004 to 2018, this paper analyzed the impacts of incentive mechanism of village committee head on the income growth of rural residents and explored the mediating effect of public investment by a fixed effect model. Results show that the annual salary of village committee head has been increasing gradually from 5 500.55 CNY/person in 2004 to 26 480.49 CNY/person in 2018. However, the percentage of annual salary growth coupling with assessment indicators, crucial assessment indicator being economic development and salary deduction by greater than or equal to 10% when crucial assessment indicator not meeting the target showed a decreasing trend. The per capita net income in villages maintained steady growth, and it increased from 3 735.71 CNY in 2004 to 12 020.34 CNY in 2018. The income of rural residents in developed eastern coastal areas represented by Jiangsu Province was much higher than that in other areas. This research also found that both the annual salary and crucial assessment indicator significantly affected per capita net income. The annual salary imposed influences on per capita net income through the amounts of public investment partially funded by the village collective. Based on these findings, this paper suggested that the government should set reasonable assessment indicators for village committee head, increase annual salary of village committee head, and enlarge the scale of public investment in underdeveloped villages.