城乡要素共生背景下的土地入股双层多方利益博弈主体合作机制

在城乡要素共生背景下,为了探寻土地入股多方参与主体的合作机制,从理论层面建立双层多方演化博弈模型,对地方政府、资本下乡企业、农户、集体经济组织4方参与土地入股合作的利益博弈关系进行剖析,得到各方合作的稳定策略,并基于对内蒙古固阳县马铃薯专业合作社的调查,对多方合作演化博弈模型的稳定策略选择进行验证性分析。研究发现,土地增值收益的合理分配、政府的政策奖励、土地入股合作参与主体的心理预期收益,以及对合谋行为的惩罚力度等都对土地入股合作的稳定性产生较大影响。为构建土地入股四方主体的合作机制,提出如下建议:拓展土地入股合作,提高超额收益;提高违约金,降低各方违约的概率;减少额外收益,提高各方合作的稳定性;根据入股比例确定利益分配系数,提高利益分配均衡性;提高政府奖励与农户获取的其他收入,调动各方合作积极性;提高集体经济组织所得酬劳,增强合作积极性;增大对集体经济组织合谋的惩罚,遏制合谋行为的发生。

Land-shareholding double-layer multi-party interest game cooperation mechanism under background of integration of urban and rural factors

Under the background of urban-rural factors integration, in order to explore the multi-party cooperation mechanism of land-shareholding, a two-layer multi-party evolutionary game model was constructed in the present assay from the theoretical level, and the interest game relationship of the four parties involved in the cooperation of local governments, capital enterprise, farmers, and collective economic organizations was analyzed, and a stable strategy for cooperation within all parties was obtained. Based on the survey data of potato specialty cooperatives in Guyang County, Inner Mongolia, a confirmatory analysis of the stable strategy selection of the multi-party cooperative evolutionary game model was conducted, and the corresponding cooperation mechanism was revealed to promote the continuous and stable progress of land equity cooperation and promote the effective symbiosis of urban and rural factors. It was found that the rational distribution of land value-added income, the government’s policy incentives, the psychological expected income of the participants in the land-share participation cooperation, and the punishment of collusion behavior had great impact on the stability of land-shareholding cooperation. In order to build the cooperation mechanism of the four parties of land investment, suggestions were put forward as follows: expand the cooperation of land investment and increase the excess returns, increase the liquidated damages to reduce the probability of default, reduce additional benefits to improve the stability of cooperation, determine the coefficient of interest distribution according to the proportion of shares to improve the equilibrium of interest distribution, increase government incentives and other income obtained by farmers to mobilize the enthusiasm of all parties for cooperation, increase the income earned by collective economic organizations and enhance their enthusiasm for cooperation, and increase the punishment of collective economic organization collusion to curb the occurrence of collusion behavior.