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秦岭贫困山区退耕还林(草)和禁伐政策实施低效的博弈解析
引用本文:王亚娟,刘小鹏,马俊杰.秦岭贫困山区退耕还林(草)和禁伐政策实施低效的博弈解析[J].水土保持通报,2002,22(3):39-42.
作者姓名:王亚娟  刘小鹏  马俊杰
作者单位:1. 西北大学,环境科学系,陕西,西安,710069
2. 宁夏大学,城市与环境科学系,宁夏,银川,750021
基金项目:陕西省教委基金项目"关中周边地区森林生态环境潜在价值研究"
摘    要:根据博弈论基本原理 ,探讨了在秦岭贫困山区实施退耕还林 (草 )和禁伐政策过程中 ,各经济利益主体的不同经济行为动机及其相关现象。研究指出 ,造成退耕还林 (草 )和禁伐政策实施低效的原因是各博弈主体由于利己思想 ,而难以摆脱“囚徒困境”。据此 ,必须建立以合作为中心 ,以符合各主体经济利益为目的的协调机制 ,实现贫困山区退耕还林 (草 )和禁伐政策的顺利实施。

关 键 词:退耕还林(草)和禁伐政策  经济利益  合作  贫困山区  博弈分析
文章编号:1000-288X(2002)03-0039-04
收稿时间:1/2/2002 12:00:00 AM
修稿时间:2002年1月2日

Game Analysis on Inefficiency of Policy in Transformation of Farm Land and Fell ing Trees Forbiddenness in Poverty Area of Qinling Mountain
WANG Ya juan,LIU Xiao peng and MA Jun jie.Game Analysis on Inefficiency of Policy in Transformation of Farm Land and Fell ing Trees Forbiddenness in Poverty Area of Qinling Mountain[J].Bulletin of Soil and Water Conservation,2002,22(3):39-42.
Authors:WANG Ya juan  LIU Xiao peng and MA Jun jie
Institution:WANG Ya juan 1,LIU Xiao peng 2,MA Jun jie 1
Abstract:The different behavior intention and related phenomena of every economic interest part are explored based on the game theory during the transformation from farm land to reforestation and felling trees forbiddenness in the poverty mountain area. The reasons of policy inefficient implemented are "zero-sum game" of every gamble part, so they could not break away from "prisoners dilemma". Harmony mechanism whose center is cooperation and aim is in accordance with every part economic interest must be established.
Keywords:transformation from farm land to reforestation and felling trees forbiddeness  economic interest  poverty mountain area of Qinling mountain  cooperation  gamble analysis
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