| 农业产业化龙头企业与农户博弈实证分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 景为,侯军岐,刘录民.农业产业化龙头企业与农户博弈实证分析[J].中国农业科技导报,2008,10(3):116-119. |
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| 作者姓名： | 景为 侯军岐 刘录民 |
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| 作者单位： | （1.西北农林科技大学经管学院, 陕西 杨凌 ,712100,2.北京信息科技大学, 北京 100085） |
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| 基金项目： | 北京市人文社科重点项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 在分析我国农业产业化中龙头企业与农户利益关系现状的基础上,分别建立了固定价格、违约金情况下和项目资金投入情况下的博弈模型,从中
发现增加违约金条款以及项目资金作为专用性投入可以有效地提高双方的违约成本,增强契约的稳定性,是完善双方关系的一条有效途径。
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| 关 键 词： | 业产业化 博弈模型 契约 稳定性 |
| 收稿时间： | 2008-03-25 |
| 修稿时间： | 2008-04-21 |
An Empirical Analysis on the Game between Leading Agricultural
Industry Enterprises and Farm Households |
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| JING Wei,HOU Jun-qi,LIU Lu-min.An Empirical Analysis on the Game between Leading Agricultural
Industry Enterprises and Farm Households [J].Journal of Agricultural Science and Technology,2008,10(3):116-119. |
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| Authors: | JING Wei HOU Jun-qi LIU Lu-min |
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| Institution: | (1.College of Economics and Management, Northwest A &|F University, Shaanxi Yangling 712100； 2.Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Beijing 100085, China) |
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| Abstract: | On the basis of analyzing the present status of benefit relation between leading agricultural industry enterprises and farm
households, this paper sets up game models under fixed price, insurance price arrangement condition and project capital input
condition respectively. From these models, the authors find that insurance price arrangement and project capital as asset
specific inputs can effectively increase the costs for disobeying contract by both sides, thus to buildup the contract
stability. This is an effective way to improve the relationship between both sides. |
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| Keywords: | agricultural industrialization game model contract stability |
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