基于利益趋向的农村居民点整治分析

农村居民点整治主体的意愿评价是开展土地整治工作的基础。该文运用实地调查与访谈、GIS空间分析等手段与方法,对山西省武乡县115个抽样村进行逐级筛选,并划分为自然地质灾害型、人为地质灾害型、城镇改造型、自然衰退型和内部发展型5种农村居民点整治类型;在此基础上,构建地方政府-村民集体整治意愿博弈模型,分别从地方政府和村民的利益趋向入手选取指标,量化分析地方政府与村民对农村居民点的整治意愿,为整治工作地合理开展提供理论依据。结果表明,地方政府更倾向于整治偏远山区的小规模农村居民点,而对于城郊农村居民点的整治意愿不够强烈;自然衰退型和城镇改造型农村居民点的村民整治意愿均不够强烈,而内部发展型和人为地质灾害型农村居民点的村民比较支持整治工作。该研究对农村居民点整治的前期分析具有科学有效的指导意义。

Analysis of rural residential land consolidation based on willingness classification

Abstract: As an effective measure, rural residential land consolidation can not only intensify the rural residential land use, but also relieve the contradiction of urban and rural land use. We used the geological data and economic social materials gotten by GIS spatial techniques, global observation and interviews, and made empirical researches in Wuxiang County, Shanxi Province. Firstly, divide the type of rural residential land consolidation. As the diversity in terrain, economy and population structure, the rural settlements were different. This study chose 8 factors in 3 aspects, and used them to classify the settlements into 4 types, which were geological disaster type, urban development type, natural recession type and internal development type. It was very meaningful to divide villages of the study area into respective rural residential land consolidation types, because it not only helped us find out the current situation of the overall rural residential land utilization, but also coordinated the consolidation potential of individual village. So the division of rural residential land consolidation types was the basis for other researches of rural residential land consolidation. Then, establish the game theory model about consolidation willingness between local government and village collective, and use it to analyze the feasibility of different rural residential land consolidation types. As the administrator of the region, the government wanted to improve the living condition of peasants and raise the level of economic development through rural residential land consolidation. Also, villagers were the immediate stakeholders of rural settlement, so they had rights to determine whether the land is consolidated or not. With the property of public welfare, the local government had the leading role in rural residential land consolidation, so this game model was the dynamic game of complete information, which meant the local government took action first. The strategies of peasants were affected by the actions of the government. If the local government would like to consolidate the rural settlement, it would provide compensation for the villagers, and the villagers could spend less. If the local government would not like to do it, the peasants would suffer from more stress which came from funds. Based on this, we deployed the multi-factor assessment method to evaluate the willingness of the 2 players. We considered gains and cost when the government took action, containing 5 indices which were consolidation potential, population, rural housing land area per capita, terrain niche and distance between settlements and main streets. We chose 6 indices on the aspects of population structure, living condition, development prospect to analyze the willingness of villagers. We chose 24 settlements to evaluate, and found that the settlements of Payoff I could be consolidated, the government had better provide policies beneficial to settlement consolidation for payoff II, the settlements of Payoff III could be improved by the villagers, and the settlements of Payoff IV needn't be consolidated in the near future. The study can provide an effective reference for rural residential land consolidation, and the accuracy of its result is also associated with the work plan of rural residential land consolidation.