博弈论在耕地保护监管过程中的应用

目的]为耕地保护监管提供科学依据。方法]假设博弈双方是理性的经济人,建立了地方政府和监察部门的博弈模型,对不同条件下的地方政府和中央监察部门的选择进行了博弈分析。结果]当实施监管与不实施监管没有差异时,地方政府违规操作的最优概率ε=C/ζY(1+N),这表示地方政府将以最优概率*ε选择违规操作;如地方政府选择违规操作的概率*ε<ε,中央政府监管部门的最优选择是不监管;地方政府选择违规操作的概率*ε>ε,中央政府监管部门的最优选择是监管。违规操作和循规操作无差异时的均衡概率*δ=1/(ζN),监管概率*δ>δ时,地方政府的最优选择是循规操作。结论]在耕地保护监管过程中,要减少监管的概率,就要改进监管质量和加大对地方政府违规操作的惩罚力度。

Application of Game Tlaeory in the Process of Farmland Protection and Supervsion

Objective] The study was to provide the scientific basis for farmland protection and supervision.Method] Both sides of game theory were assumed to be rational economic man and the game theory model of local government and supervision department was established,and the game analysis of the choice of local government and supervision department under different conditions was taken.Result] When there was no difference between implemented supervision and no supervision,the optimum probability of violation operation for the local government was ε = C/ζY(1+N),this expressed that the local government would choose the violation operation with the optimum probability *ε.If the local governmentthe selected the violation operation probability of *ε<ε,the optimal selection of supervision department of the central government was no supervision.When the local government selected the violation operation probability of *ε>ε,the optimal selection of supervision department of the central government was supervision.The equilibrium probability was *δ=1/(ζN) when violation operation and following operation had no differences.When the supervision probability was *δ>δ,the optimal selection of local government was following operation.Conclusion] In the process of farmland protection and supervision,if the supervision probability wanted to be decreased,the supervision quality must be improved and the punishment power of violation operation of the local government must be increased.