信用评级机构监管的演化动态博弈分析

清代士子一旦中举，即失去了原有的官学学生资格，但举人仍有读书应试之需。于是，至清代晚期，各地出现由官府创建的专课举人的书院，专门招收举人，开展应试教育。与此不同，有的书院则兼课举人，并由官府设立孝廉课，专课举人。从总体上而言，专课举人和兼课举人的书院以培养生徒参加会试、殿试为目的，不仅在考课时模拟会试、殿试，而且在经费的投入、对考课的重视程度上，都超过了同一地区的其他书院，使肄业于书院的举人在竞争激烈的会试、殿试中脱颖而出的几率明显提高。

Evolutionary Dynamics of an Asymmetric Game between CRAs and Relating Regulators

The worldwide financial crisis shows us again the importance and indispensability of the regulation on the crediting rating agencies. Under the conditions of limited rationality, these are five equilibrium points in the replication system of game between credit rating agencies and regulators. And in four different situations, it closes to different equilibriums. The results prove that four ways can be used by regulators to control the illegal behaviors of credit rating agencies, including imposing severe penalty, prompting reputational constraint, bridging the revenue gap between illegal and legal behaviors and improving the regulation efficiency.