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国防工业发展中的三方博弈分析
引用本文:曹少琛,张 飞,孙兆斌.国防工业发展中的三方博弈分析[J].湖南农业大学学报(自然科学版),2016(2):57-61.
作者姓名:曹少琛  张 飞  孙兆斌
作者单位:(军事经济学院数学系 物流与采购系,湖北 武汉 430035)
摘    要:利用博弈论的方法对国防工业发展中已进入国防工业的企业群、待进入国防工业的企业群和政府的对策进行分析,并得出结论:政府首先要指导已进入国防工业的企业群合理定位;其次要考虑制定多大程度的保护政策来保护已进入国防工业企业的发展和利益;最后政府需要对军工企业的诉讼制定合理的支持标准,使已进入国防工业企业始终处于竞争环境良性发展.当然政府作出以上决策的主要依据是在保证本国安全的前提下使国防工业企业的利润实现最大化.

关 键 词:三方博弈  国防工业  完全信息  政府行为选择

Trilateral Game Analysis in the Development of the Defense Industry
CAO Shao-chen,ZHANG Fei,SUN Zhao-bin.Trilateral Game Analysis in the Development of the Defense Industry[J].Journal of Hunan Agricultural University,2016(2):57-61.
Authors:CAO Shao-chen  ZHANG Fei  SUN Zhao-bin
Institution:(Military Economic Academy Mathematics department, Logistics and procurement department,Wuhan Hubei 430035)
Abstract:This paper makes use of game theory to analyze the countermeasures among the enterprises group entered defense industry, the enterprises group that plan to enter defense industry, and government in the development of the defense industry, which concludes that: firstly, the government must guide enterprises group entered defense industry to position themselves rationally; secondly, the government must protect the development and interests of the enterprises entered the defense industrial through considering the degree of protection policies; finally, the government needs to develop a reasonable litigation support standard for military enterprises, so that the enterprises entered the defense industry could develop in a competitive environment. What is more, the main basis for the government to make decisions above is in the premise of ensuring the maximum profits of national defense enterprises.
Keywords:Trilateral game  Defense industry  Complete information  government behavior selection
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