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农村居民点综合整治中不同利益主体博弈行为分析
引用本文:王兵,许月明.农村居民点综合整治中不同利益主体博弈行为分析[J].天津农业科学,2012,18(1):69-72.
作者姓名:王兵  许月明
作者单位:1. 河北农业大学国土资源学院,河北保定,071000
2. 河北农业大学商学院,河北保定,071000
基金项目:河北省社会科学基金项目(HB10EYJ172);河北省社科联2010年度河北省社会科学发展研究课题(201004037)
摘    要:从博弈论的角度探讨了农村居民点综合整治过程中相关利益主体的行为和博弈关系。研究表明:(1)地方政府行为倾向是决定农村居民点综合整治效果的关键因素;(2)中央政府应降低监督成本,并采取措施减小地方政府的机会主义倾向;(3)中央政府应建立科学合理的农村居民点综合整治补偿标准和整治收益分配机制。

关 键 词:农村居民点综合整治  不同利益主体  博弈

Game Behavior Analysis about Stakeholder Between the Land Consolidation of Rural Area
WANG Bing , XU Yue-ming.Game Behavior Analysis about Stakeholder Between the Land Consolidation of Rural Area[J].Tianjin Agricultural Sciences,2012,18(1):69-72.
Authors:WANG Bing  XU Yue-ming
Institution:1.College of land and resources of Agriculture University of Hebei,Baoding,Hebei 071001,China;2.Business College of Agricultual University of Hebei,Baoding,HeBei 071001,China)
Abstract:Studied the decision of the main acts from the game theory,during the different stakeholders,analyzed behavior tendency about different stakeholders.The results showed that:(1)The behavior of local government was the key factor of the land consolidation of rural residential area;(2)The central government should reduce the monitoring cost to lesson the opportunism of the local government;(3)The central government should establish the compensation guideline and the diatribution of income of the land consolidation of rural residential area.
Keywords:land consolidation of rural residential area  different stakeholders  game
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