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博弈架构下我国食品安全问题研究
引用本文:王志远,黎昌珍.博弈架构下我国食品安全问题研究[J].安徽农业科学,2012,40(15):8752-8755.
作者姓名:王志远  黎昌珍
作者单位:1. 广西民族师范学院政治与公共管理系,广西崇左,532200
2. 广西大学公共管理学院,广西南宁,530004
基金项目:国家社会科学基金,教育部人文社会科学研究项目,广西民族师范学院引进人才资助项目,云南财经大学引进人才资助项目
摘    要:界定了商品真假(食品是否安全)的一般内涵,分别对单商家、双商家、多商家商品出售进行了博弈分析,表明在无相关约束机制下,商家出售假货(问题食品)是博弈的必然结果,会使食品安全问题日益突出。提出了解决食品安全问题的博弈路径:需引入健全有效的监管机制,改变原有的博弈结构,食品安全问题自然会得到解决;另外,道德机制的引入,使全社会流淌着道德的血液,是解决该问题的一个低成本甚至无成本的补充措施。

关 键 词:食品安全  博弈论  博弈逻辑  内在成因  解决机制

Study on China Food Safety under the Frame of Game Theory
Institution:WANG Zhi-yuan et al(Department of Politics & Public Management,Guangxi Normal University for Nationalities,Chongzuo,Guangxi 532200)
Abstract:The standards to define the genuine products and counterfeits were introduced and the products sales of single dealer,two dealers and multiple dealers were analyzed by game theory.As indicated by the results,without relevant disciplinary mechanisms,the sellers would inevitably sell the counterfeits,which will exacerbate the food safety problems.Finally some solutions were proposed to settle the food safety problems,an effective supervision system should be introduced to alternate the original game structure,and then the food safety problems would be naturally solved;the introduction of ethnics supervision mechanism is a costless supplement to settle the problems.
Keywords:Food safety  Game theory  Game logic  Inherent causes  Settlement mechanism
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