Feasibility of a single-species quota system for management of the Malaysian multispecies purse-seine fishery

Malaysian fisheries employ multiple measures to improve management; however, not all are well-suited to the multispecies fisheries. As part of a pilot project, an individual quota system was introduced for the purse-seine fishery off the East Coast of Peninsular Malaysia (ECPM), but no assessment of this particular measure nor the feasibly of its implementation has been confirmed. Therefore, this study analysed spatial and temporal patterns of purse-seine fishing, by collecting catch composition data per landing and its fishing ground within three period fishery surveys between August 2017 and September 2018 at six different landing sites. Similarity and cluster analysis examined species composition and diversity to determine the feasibility of implementing a single-species quota system in this multispecies fishery. Some overlapped of indices results and minor difference in catch composition were found due to changes in spatial and temporal fishing activities. However, no specific spatial or temporal patterns were discernible as structuring the fishing grounds used by purse-seiners. The absence of patterns, using the available data, might be attributable to huge species aggregations and widely distributed and homogenously mixed fish stocks. Thus, it is likely impractical to manage species individually in such a multispecies fishery.     

Stock assessment and management for walleye pollock in Japan

We review the stock assessment strategies and management procedures for walleye pollock Theragra chalcogramma in Japan. In Japan, walleye pollock is classified into 4 stocks. Because biological data, fishing conditions, etc. are different for each stock, the stocks are assessed by different methods. Harvest strategies aiming at stock recovery are proposed for the Northern Japan Sea stock and the Nemuro Strait stock, which are currently in poor condition. For the Japanese Pacific stock and the Southern Okhotsk Sea stock, which are in good condition, harvest strategies for current fishery operations are proposed. In Japan, fisheries co-management has traditionally been carried out, and in recent years a total catch limitation system called the total allowable catch, a resource recovery plan, and a resource management plan have also been implemented. Although a plan is devised that accounts for the stock conditions of walleye pollock, it is also necessary to consider socioeconomic factors, ecosystem factors, and so on. However, we consider that the main focus of stock management for walleye pollock will still be maintaining fishing pressure at an appropriate level, which includes regulating fish size and price during the fishing season.     

Interannual changes in the timing of walleye pollock spawning migration and their impacts on the gillnet fishery in the southwestern Pacific coast of Hokkaido,Donan area,Japan

The southwestern Pacific coast of Hokkaido is the main spawning ground for the Japanese Pacific stock of walleye pollock Theragra chalcogramma. A commercial gillnet fishery targeting spawning adult pollock in this area mainly operates from October to January to coincide with the migration of adult pollock from the feeding ground. Given the results of acoustic surveys, and changes in the proportion of the monthly total catch that was monthly walleye pollock caught by the commercial gillnet fishery, it is thought that the timing of walleye pollock spawning migration to the Donan area varies among years and that the pollock catch of the gillnet fishery clearly reflects changes in pollock abundance in this area. A time series of interannual variability in catch data from 1980 to 2005 suggested that adult pollock migrated and concentrated on their spawning ground later in the 1980s and after 2000 than in the 1990s. Such decadal-scale shifts are presumably caused by climatic changes (e.g., in water temperature) in the Oyashio region. These shifts affect the gillnet fishery through differences in monthly unit prices of pollock and changes in the formation of fishing grounds. These scientific findings can aid the establishment of rules for more efficient walleye pollock resource management under the total allowable catch system.     

越南开发南海金枪鱼资源的历史和趋势

近十年来,越南将南海的金枪鱼资源作为其＂外向型＂渔业的重要支撑,不断增加捕捞强度,产量逐年升高。本文总结了越南发展南海金枪鱼渔业的过程,分析了南海金枪鱼资源的开发趋势。越南现代化的金枪鱼捕捞技术主要来自日本,使用的渔具主要有金枪鱼延绳钓、手钓、刺网和小型围网,捕捞的种类主要为鲣鱼、黄鳍金枪鱼和大眼金枪鱼,主要作业区域在西沙群岛南部海域和南沙群岛海域。越南2009年金枪鱼的产量已达到5.9×104t,计划2015年达到30×104t。根据越南海洋渔业研究所（RIMF）的评估,南海中西部的金枪鱼资源量为66~67×104t,可捕量23.3×104t,其中鲣鱼的可捕量21.6×104t,黄鳍金枪鱼和大眼金枪鱼的可捕量1.7×104t。随着全球金枪鱼捕捞配额的缩减和越南＂外向型＂渔业经济的发展,越南将继续加强对南海金枪鱼资源的开发。     

基于空间自相关模型的南极半岛北部水域南极磷虾渔场时空演变特征

南极磷虾是南极海域生态系统的关键物种,是南极渔业的主要捕捞对象,其渔场具有显著的时空分布特征.为明晰南极半岛北部水域磷虾渔场的变动情况,本研究根据中国2010—2020年南极磷虾渔业统计资料,运用全局Moran's I指数和热点分析对该水域磷虾渔场的时空分布特征进行了分析.结果显示,南极半岛北部水域磷虾渔获量在空间分布...     

Incentive effect of joint and several liability in fishery cooperatives on regulatory compliance

Cooperative‐based catch share systems can be implemented such that the members of the same fishery cooperative are jointly and severally liable for not exceeding collectively assigned fishing rights. In practice, this means that a regulator can take away catch privileges from an entire cooperative that overruns its collective quota, effectively creating a penalty much larger than what could be recovered with an individual fine. Fishery cooperatives then typically implement their own internal compliance regime that includes monitoring and penalties. This article first reviews compliance practice in cooperative‐based catch share systems by examining the commonalities and differences in the way compliance regimes are structured (observation and reporting requirements, penalty scheme, internal enforcement authority and indemnification mechanisms) in a number of internal agreements from fishery cooperatives in North America and in Europe. Based on our review of cooperatives and the literature on compliance, we discuss how incentives to comply may be different for an individual fisherman operating in a fishery cooperative where joint and several liability applies as compared to an individual fishing quota baseline situation without fishery cooperative. Our review suggests that, from the regulators’ point of view, joint and several liability can increase the level of compliance for a given enforcement expenditure. However, the regulator cannot rely solely on cooperatives to carry out controls and must ensure that the cooperatives themselves have an interest in setting up an effective monitoring system and will enforce sanctions within the cooperative.     

Does ‘race to fish’ behaviour emerge in an individual transferable quota fishery when the total allowable catch becomes non‐binding?

Successful individual transferable quota (ITQ) management requires a binding (constraining) total allowable catch (TAC). A non‐binding TAC may result in a shift back towards open access conditions, where fishers increasingly compete (‘race’) to catch their share of the total harvest. This process was examined by comparing fishing fleet behaviour and profitability in the Tasmanian southern rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii) fishery (TSRLF), Australia. Between 2008 and 2010, the TSRLF had a non‐binding TAC and effectively reverted to a regulated, limited‐entry fishery. Fishers' uncertainty about future profitability and their ability to take their allocated catch weakened the security characteristic of the ITQ allocation. The low quota lease price contributed to an increase in fleet capacity, while the more limited reduction in quota asset value proved an investment barrier, hindering the autonomous adjustment of quota towards the most efficient fishers. In the TSRLF, catch rates vary more than beach price and are therefore more important for determining daily revenue (i.e., price x catch rate) than market price. Consequently, fishers concentrated effort during times of higher catch rates rather than high market demand. This increased rent dissipation as fishers engaged in competitive race to fish to be the first to exploit the stock and obtain higher catch rates. The history of this fishery emphasizes the need for a constraining TAC in all ITQ fisheries, not only for stock management, but also to manage the security of the ITQ allocation and prevent unanticipated and undesirable changes in fisher behaviour and fishery profitability.     

论福建近海渔业和渔业资源的管理

本文根据近海渔业资源衰退的实际,有针对性地提出渔业和渔业资源管理具体措施和建议,主要是:(1)削减捕捞力量,优化捕捞作业结构;(2)实施TAC制度;(3)渔获量配额管理和提高渔获物附加值;(4)伏季休渔和产卵场保护;(5)种群最小可捕标准和渔具最小尺寸;(6)重点保护生活史k选择的种群;(7)增殖放流明显衰退的经济种类;(8)杜绝毒、炸、电违规捕捞;(9)控制对沿岸海域的污染,保护渔业生态环境;(10)加强资源监测和预测,开展渔情预报;(11)完善渔业统计,建立渔捞记录制度;(12)强化渔业法和水产资源繁殖保护条例的宣传教育力度;(13)开展渔业资源普查工作等等。     

Spatio‐temporal management of fisheries to reduce by‐catch and increase fishing selectivity

Time/area closures have been widely used in fisheries management to prevent overfishing and the destruction of marine biodiversity. To a lesser degree, such spatio‐temporal management measures have been used to reduce by‐catch of finfish or protected species. However, as ecosystem‐based management approaches are employed and more fisheries are managed through multispecies, multiobjective models, the management of by‐catch will likely become increasingly important. The elimination of by‐catch has become a primary goal of the fishing policies of many countries. It is particularly relevant in the United States, as the deadline for setting annual catch limits (ACLs) in all fisheries passes in 2011. This will result in a dramatic expansion of the number of catch and by‐catch quotas. Such catch measures may result in the early closure of otherwise sustainable fisheries when by‐catch quotas are exceeded. To prevent such closures and the consequent economic hardship to fishers and the economy, it is imperative that managers be given the tools necessary to reduce by‐catch and improve fishing selectivity. Targeted spatio‐temporal fishery closures are one solution open to managers. Here, we examine how the spatio‐temporal and oceanographic characteristics of by‐catch may be used by managers to design fishery closures, and place these methods within a decision tree to assist managers to identify appropriate management measures. We argue that the current movement towards marine spatial planning (MSP) presents an important impetus to examine how we manage fisheries spatially, and we offer a first step towards the objective participation of fisheries in the MSP process.     

Recreational charter fishery attributes and variation in key species catches and discards: Resource management considerations

Strategic long‐term sampling programmes that deliver recreational catch, effort and species demographic data are required for the effective assessment and management of recreational fisheries and harvested organisms. This study used a spatially and temporally stratified observer programme to examine variation in the rates, quantities and lengths of retained and discarded catches of key species in a recreational charter fishery. Geographic region, but not season, significantly influenced catch rates of key demersal species, being driven by temporally persistent latitudinal clines in environmental conditions influencing species distributions. There was considerable trip‐to‐trip variation in catch rates that were attributed to localised differences in fishing operations, locations, environmental conditions and client preferences. Broad trends in retained and discarded catch rates were nevertheless, similar across different fishing effort standardisations (per‐trip, per‐hour, per‐client, per‐client/fished hour), demonstrating that the coarsest unit of effort could be used in fishery assessments. Discard rates of organisms were variable and driven by a combination of mandated legal lengths, individual client and operator preferences for particular species and sizes of organisms, and not due to attainment of catch quotas or high‐grading. This study has identified important fishery attributes that require consideration in assessing charter fisheries and stocks of recreational fish species.     

Empirical move‐on rules to inform fishing strategies: a New England case study

Increasingly, fisheries are being managed under catch quotas that are often further allocated to specific permit holders or sectors. At the same time, serious consideration is being given to the effects of discards on the health of target and non‐target species. Some quota systems have incorporated discard reduction as an objective by counting discards (including unmarketable fish) against the overall quota. The potential effect of the introduction of a quota system that includes accountability for discards on the fishing strategies employed by fishermen is enormous. This is particularly true for multispecies fisheries where healthy and depleted stocks co‐exist; resulting in a trip's catch being applied to very large and very small stock quotas simultaneously. Under such a scenario, fishermen have a strong incentive to minimize (i) catch of low‐quota or ‘choke’ stocks, (ii) regulatory discards due to minimum size limits and (iii) catch partially consumed by predators. ‘Move‐on’ rules (i.e. event‐triggered, targeted, temporary closure of part of a fishery when a catch or bycatch threshold is reached) have been employed in a variety of fisheries. However, their efficacy has been limited by a lack of empirical analyses underpinning the rules. Here, we examine the utility of spatiotemporal autocorrelation analyses to inform ‘move‐on’ rules to assist a sector of the New England Multispecies Fishery to reduce discards and maximize profits. We find the use of empirical move‐on rules could reduce catch of juvenile and choke stocks between 27 and 33%, and depredation events between 41 and 54%.     

Can small-scale fisheries survive market-based management? Nordic evidence

Market-based fisheries management systems give incentives to reduce the fleet size and employment, which increases earnings and contributes to resolve the tragedy of the commons. However, the often-stated expectation that economies of scale cause the disappearance of small-scale fishery is not observed in many cases. In this study, we investigate the effects on fleet structure in the period after introducing individual fishing quotas or individual fishing days with various degrees of transferability in selected fisheries in the seven Nordic countries. Despite observing economies of scale in most cases, it is found that the market-based fisheries management often does not reduce the small-scale fleet more than the fleet of large vessels. This is explained partly by small vessels targeting demersal species and large vessels pelagic species, and partly by the larger need of larger than small vessels to continuously utilize their capital stocks through fast adaptation to ensure return. A more important explanation is the regulation design, with limitations in sale of fishing rights and lease between vessel groups and regions and in the share of the total quota holdings of fishing rights by individuals and vessels. This is important for countries considering the introduction of market-based fisheries management, since the Nordic experiences show that with proper regulation design, economic gains can be achieved with small-scale fishing surviving even under economies of scale.     

南海北部眼镜鱼资源利用状况研究

根据2008-2019年南海北部渔港渔业生产抽样调查数据,统计得出南海北部的眼镜鱼(Mene maculata)产量主要来自于灯光围网,占其总产量的93.38%。利用剩余产量模型对围网作业功率在300 kW以上、功率在200~300 kW和功率在100~200 kW的CPUE数据进行了分析。模型计算出南海北部眼镜鱼的最大可持续产量在151128.99~163139.34 t,平均为155298.09 t。依据处于优势地位的围网作业功率在200~300 kW的CPUE数据的模型评估认为,2019年发生了过度捕捞。该鱼种的总可捕量宜下调为3.6×10⁴t。     

Co-management without involvement: the plight of fishing communities

This paper discusses the role of fishing communities in the stewardship of their adjacent fish resources, and the benefits associated with community participation in co‐management. Contrary to the view of most fisheries management agencies, local communities are able to design institutions that can successfully restore equity and limit access to the fishery. The dismissal of local concerns may be at the root of biological and social crises in fisheries, and the privatization of common fishing rights world‐wide through individual transferable quotas (ITQs) is contributing to these problems. Community involvement that is embedded into a network of management at larger spatial scales would allow fishing communities to regain some control over their livelihoods. Meaningful co‐management arrangements must go beyond consultation by redirecting the flow of social and economic benefits from the fishery back into communities. Unless geographically defined communities are allowed to share power and responsibility with government fisheries managers, both fish stocks and fishing as a way of life are in danger of vanishing.     

Co‐management in Latin American small‐scale shellfisheries: assessment from long‐term case studies

Co‐management (Co‐M), defined as the sharing of management tasks and responsibilities between governments and local users, is emerging as a powerful institutional arrangement to redress fisheries paradigm failures, yet long‐term assessments of its performance are lacking. A comparative analysis of five small‐scale Latin American shellfisheries was conducted to identify factors suggesting success and failure. In Chile, Uruguay and Mexico Co‐M produced positive effects, including stabilization of landings at low levels, increase in abundance, CPUE, unit prices and revenues per unit of effort, and reduced interannual variability in several fishery indicators, particularly in landings. Co‐M was successful because it was mainly bottom‐up implemented and accompanied by‐catch shares (spatial property rights and community quotas). By contrast, Co‐M implementation was unable to prevent the collapse of the Galapagos sea cucumber fishery, as reflected by a decrease in abundance and CPUE. Negative effects were also observed in the Galapagos spiny lobster fishery during Co‐M implementation. However, recovery was observed in recent years, reflected in a stabilization of fishing effort and the highest CPUE and economic revenues observed since the beginning of the Co‐M implementation phase. The combined effects of market forces, climate variability and a moratorium on fishing effort were critical in fishery recovery. We conclude that Co‐M is not a blueprint that can be applied to all shellfisheries to enhance their governability. These social–ecological systems need to be managed by jointly addressing problems related to the resources, their marine environment and the people targeting them, accounting for their socioeconomic and cultural contexts.     

基于灰色系统的北太平洋柔鱼渔汛特征分析及旺汛期预测

柔鱼(Ommastrephes bartramii)是大洋性经济头足类,是我国远洋鱿钓渔船重要的捕捞对象。分析柔鱼渔汛特征并预测旺汛期,有助于柔鱼资源的合理开发与利用。本研究根据2013―2017年北太平洋柔鱼渔业生产统计数据,以每日平均渔获量(CPUEday)作为资源丰度,利用分位数的方法划分旺汛期;结合灰色波形预测方法,对旺汛期日期序列建立灰色波形预测模型群[GM(1,1)模型],对旺汛期出现的时间进行预测。结果显示,北太平洋柔鱼渔汛时间最早为5月12日,一直持续到年终;旺汛期为每年的8―11月,第1旺汛期基本在8月出现。GM(1,1)模型的平均相对误差为6.83%,旺汛期日期序列预测的平均相对误差为8.19%,验证数据的平均相对误差为15.82%,表明此模型可预测北太平洋柔鱼的旺汛期。研究结果可为远洋渔业企业的高效率、合理化的科学生产提供技术支撑。     

Recruitment abundance index of Pacific bluefin tuna using fisheries data on juveniles

ABSTRACT:   The recruitment abundance index of Pacific bluefin tuna Thunnus orientalis was estimated from 1980 to 2003 fishing year by using the troll fishery data in Nagasaki Prefecture, western Japan. It has been shown that the troll fishery in Nagasaki Prefecture operates with good time–area coverage of the species habitat, and that the fishing power slightly changed during the period analyzed, based on fisheries statistics, published information, and interviews with the fishers. Average catch per unit effort (CPUEs) were standardized by a generalized linear model (GLM) considering the effects of fishing year, season and landing area. Standardized CPUE of age-0 bluefin tuna showed larger fluctuations year by year than the nominal CPUE combined for all ages. High CPUEs in fishing years of 1981, 1994, 1996 and 1999 were observed. Data from these years agreed with the higher recruitments estimated by virtual population analysis (VPA) or higher catch of age-0 fish reported for the Pacific side. The age-specific standardized CPUE of age-0 bluefin tuna in this study was judged to be a useful indicator of recruitment.     

Understanding fisheries credit systems: potentials and pitfalls of managing catch efficiency

Following implementation in a range of other resource sectors, a number of credit‐like systems have been proposed for fisheries. But confusion exists over what constitutes these nascent ‘fisheries credit’ systems and how they operate. Based on a review of credit systems in other sectors, this study fills this gap by defining how credit systems function and what credits add to prevailing fisheries management. In doing so, we distinguish ‘mitigation’ and ‘behavioural’ fishery credits. Mitigation credits require resource users to compensate for unsustainable catches of target species, by‐catch species or damaging practices on the marine environment by investing in conservation in a biologically equivalent habitat or resource. Behavioural credit systems incentivize fishers to gradually change their fishing behaviour to more sustainable fishing methods by rewarding them with, for instance, extra fishing effort to compensate for less efficient but more sustainable fishing methods. The choice of credit system largely depends on the characteristics of specific fisheries and the management goals agreed upon by managers, scientists and the fishing industry. The study concludes that fisheries credit systems are different but complimentary to other forms of management by focusing on ‘catchability’ or gear efficiency in addition to effort or catch quota, affecting overall economic efficiency by setting specific goals as to how fish are caught. Credit systems therefore incentivize specific management interventions that can directly improve stock sustainability, conserve habitat and endangered species, or decrease by‐catch.     

Examining changes in participation in recreational fisheries in England and Wales

Abstract Inland fisheries in England and Wales have high economic and social values. Managing participation to maximise fishery performance is key to maintaining this status. The capital value of fishing rights for migratory salmonid fisheries is €165 million. Coarse fisheries contribute €1030 million to the economy. The central tenet to increasing participation in recreational salmonid fisheries is that an increase in stock size will result in more anglers accessing the fishery. This was examined for salmon on the rivers Usk and Lune where exploitation restrictions increased the number of salmon available to anglers. On the River Lune, the number of salmon available post‐intervention increased by 66%. There was no significant increase in catch while the number of anglers decreased by 16.3%. On the River Usk, the closure of the net fishery potentially resulted in an additional ～1200 salmon being available. Following closure, there was no significant change in rod catch or in the number of anglers. Increased participation is dependent less upon stock manipulation for coarse fisheries and more upon facilitating the activity. In recent years, urban fishery development programmes have provided improved access to local fishing opportunity. Also, new anglers have been targeted through campaigns such as Get Hooked on Fishing and the Scout Angler Badge.     

Effects of Reduced Fishing for Feeding Salmon (Salmo salar L.) in the Baltic on Home Water Fisheries according to Simulations with the Carlin-Larsson Population Model

The Carlin-Larsson population model of Baltic salmon was used to simulate reduced effort in an offshore fishery for feeding salmon and its effect on home water fisheries. Some simplifying assumptions had to be made; no changes in seasonal mean weight or exploitation rate in the home water fisheries were assumed. With a simulated termination of the offshore fishery, seasonal mean weights from the time before the excessive offshore fishery started were also applied to give a maximum effect on the catches. The total non-catch fishing mortality in the offshore fishery was estimated at 5% per season (total M = 10% per season). A total ban on the offshore fishery would mean a sixfold increase in catch-value for home water fisheries and a total value twice that in the present situation with the present seasonal mean weights. With the higher mean weights the simulated catch would be 87% and its value 182% higher than at present.