False-Signaling Game in Security Market

Based on informational asymmetry,this article builds up a false-signaling game model in security market.The game model illuminates the mechanism of Herd Behavior in the stock market by a way in which the more-informed investor cheats the less-informed investor through the derivative financial market .Meanwhile,it makes a conclusion of separating equilibrium for common investors'security investment.Finally,the article gives some policies for reference for both the development of Chinese security market and the opening as well as development of Chinese derivative financial market.     

基于订单农业风险管理的农民专业合作社创新研究

为了有效提高农民专业合作社订单农业履约率,促进农业产业化经营。利用博弈论分析订单农业中农户和农业企业违约的条件和原因,指出利用“公司+农民专业合作社+农户”模式和金融衍生工具交易两种方式来解决订单农业违约风险问题。进而分析农民专业合作社在这两种方式中的作用,包括改变农户参与市场的弱势地位,有利于实行农产品标准化生产,提高农户的诚信度,代表农户参与期货市场等。基于此,提出农民专业合作社应扩大业务内容,实现职能创新,培养或引进专业人才,制定相关期货操作规定,禁止从事投机交易;政府则应充分发挥其监督与服务职能,由此不断提高订单农业履约率。     

Incentive Mechanism for Team Cooperation Based on Implicit Side Contract

Aiming at the free-riding problem in team incentive, this paper designs a dynamic incentive mechanism based on implicit side contract with dynamic game theory by introducing the reasonable assumption that there is horizontal monitor in team production. The theoretic analysis indicates that the dynamic incentive mechanism, in which a strict group incentive compatibility contract is taken at the first stage and an individual incentive compatibility contract is taken at the second stage, can implement team cooperation uniquely in the general condition of risk aversion and stochastic production by only two stage repeated game.     

包含双边金融期权的农村电价古诺模型研究

打破电力市场垄断,提高农村电力市场效率,以及抑制市场力滥用是当今农村电力市场改革的主要方向之一。本文基于非合作博弈理论,提出了一种含买卖双边金融期权的、按照古诺竞争模式在现货市场和期权市场进行2阶段博弈的模型。由多家独立发电商与惟一的电网公司首先在期权市场中签订双边合同,决策出各自售出的最优期权数量;之后在现货市场进行产量竞争,在各自拥有期权头寸已知的情况下,选择其发电出力使自身期望收益最大。利用反向推倒方法求解模型,分析了模型中不同参数的变化对市场均衡结果的影响。通过理论研究和算例分析证明,与现有模型相比较,本文提出的含双边金融期权模型能够更大程度上降低市场出清价格以及提高发电量,可为电力监管机构与市场决策者引导参与者有序竞争提供一种新思路。     

咸蛋黄品质定量分析标准化研究

咸蛋黄是市场上出现的新型蛋制品,没有定量化的品质评价方法,因此从咸蛋黄出油性,出沙效果,色泽及水分含量这4项指标入手,研究制定出一个规范化测量方法。结果表明：用双圈牌中速定性滤纸扩散法表达咸蛋黄出油性可信度为95%,方法可用;用石油醚为溶剂,采用搅拌、过滤、重量法测得的咸蛋黄的起沙性,可信度为98%,方法可用;通过感官评价与色差分析并用的方法,给出了咸蛋黄颜色的评价标准;本研究所提出的咸蛋黄品质的测定方法简单、实用、可信度高,是一个可以用于定量测定咸蛋黄质量的标准化方法。     

Game Analysis between Manufacturer and Wholesaler in the Management of Distribution Channel

In the distribution channel management, a good cooperation relationship between manufacture and wholesaler is an effective way for them to complement each other with their respective advantages, improve channel competitive abilities and adapt to market fluctuations. Based on their mutual cooperative relationship, a mixed game model is constituted by introducing the characteristics and postulating the prerequisites of trade between manufacturer and wholesaler, then the factors affecting their mutual cooperative relationship and the conditions of their stable cooperation are found through analyzing the mixed game model. Furthermore, a finitely repeated game model is used to analyze the cooperation between manufacturer and wholesaler, the conclusion of the cooperative qualification that influences the cooperation of both sides is given. As a result, the strategies employed by the manufacturer and wholesaler are pointed out.     

Repeated game theory intrusion detection model for the Internet of Things

The existing security methods cannot be applied to the Internet of Things due to the defects of communication nodes. To solve this problem, an intrusion detection model based on repeated game theory is presented. A repeated game model algorithm for detecting malicious nodes is built, and the algorithm of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) is used for optimizing the model and making results reach the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, a common punishment strategy is introduced to improve the success of transfer data in this model. The results of the simulation represent that this model can restrain malicious nodes attacking effectively and improve the efficiency of network.     

Analysis of the Game Model of Supervision on Swindle in the Securities Market

Swindle exists commonly in any securities markets, where swindle has led to serious influences on regulations and the normal development of our securities market. The paper attempts to develop a game model of supervision on swindle in the securities market so as to investigate the relationship between supervisor and supervisee from the microcosmic aspect, and analyze the microcosmic mechanism resulting to swindle in the securities market, and enlighten our securities supervision as to swindle in the securities market.     

A game analysis on the personal behavior modes under governmental regulation

Market economy is the credit economy and principal of credibility is the foundation of market mechanism. With the development of economic reform, it is well concerned that discredit order of the society has become one of serious social problems which enhance the transaction cost of society. By using games analysis, reasons of discredit are studied based on personal behavior models under governmental regulation. According to the result that discredit is the result of personal choice under the existed institution, we should establish social credit management system to deal with the discredit based on credit information supplied by the independent third-part organization.     

Analysis of Manipulation on Stock Market by Institutional Investors with Economics

In order to guard against the manipulation on the stock market made by institutional investors, protect personal investors' benefits, and improve the efficiency of stock market, this article attempts to analyze the institutional manipulation that often happens in our country's stock market, its conditions, mechanism, restriction factors, and its impact on the efficiency of securities market. The analysis is conducted by employing the methods used in the information economics and the signaling game model. Furthermore, basing on the analysis results, the article proposes some constructive suggestions.     

Compensation trust evaluation model of grid service

It is difficult to distinguish the cheating and other malicious behaviours in the grid service trust evaluation. A trust evaluation model for grid service based on compensation is proposed.With market mechanism, service provider and demander present the expected profit and compensate price for their behaviours to maximize their own profit. The game theory is applied to balance the expected profit and compensate price. Based on the game theory, evaluation trade strategy achieves perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Service provider and demander can choose their own trade strategy to maximize profit. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that the service demanders can abandon the cheating motivation voluntarily, while the service providers can make right decision to choose trust evaluation. Compared with the existing model, the precision and security of the trust evaluation is enhanced greatly, while the calculating and communication cost is reduced remarkably.     

The Analyze of Capital Structure and Value of Company

Capital structure of company changes company value in a frictional market environment through cutting down cost and decreasing moral risk and causal problem in trust agency. The authors apply method of asymmetric information game to analyze how to make design of mechanism on the basis of existing revenue and cost of bankruptcy, make the company's manager maximize shareholder's wealth through maximizing own effectiveness, thus define the best radio of liabilities.The authors show that good companies have higher value than difference one in a assured mechanism, afitness capital structure could reduce the problem in trust agency of company's manager,higher risk project can bering more value for compay.     

农业社会化服务供给博弈分析

农业社会化服务主体在农业社会化服务体系中扮演重要角色,各服务主体提供的服务能否为农户带来长远利益并最终被农户持续接受是农业社会化服务持续发展的关键问题。本文以博弈论为基础,通过分析公共服务机构及中间服务组织与农户之间的博弈过程发现：公共服务机构和中间服务组织为农户提供的社会化服务的质量及其自身的成本收益成为影响农业社会化服务持续发展的重要因素,农业社会化服务若要持续稳定的发展,离不开服务主体高水平的服务和农户的积极参与。只有适应市场需求,真正能够给农户带来实惠的服务才会最终被农户所接受。     

Design for the Incentive System of Architecture Market

Architecture market is a typical dynamic game market with incomplete information, in which exists three principal parts who are proprietors, supervising companies and contractors. There is a complex principal-agent relationship among them. With the analysis of the principal-agent relationship among proprietors, supervising companies and contractors, two dynamic games of incomplete information have been established and analyzed. If the proprietor only pay instant fee to supervising company, the supervising company will take weak supervise. Only with appropriate incentive way, the strong supervise can be done. Based on it, an incentive system is established to make the supervising companies and contractors work hard, to realize the given purpose of the proprietors.     

Research on Market Targeting Model of Selecting Manager and Cooperation Mechanism in Commercial Bank Based on Stock Option

Selecting manager by market and improving team cooperation efficiency are two basal tasks to construct an effective human resource management system of commercial bank in China,but there are the limitations the traditional methods in explaining the players' cooperation.The paper constructs a market targeting model of selecting manager of commercial bank and a game model of team cooperation based on stock option,and then the talent identification mode and team cooperation mechanism in commercial bank are established.It is concluded that talented managers is selected but talent-less is refused owing to stock option incentive mechanism,and employee and managers holding stock plan is an incentive force to whole team if residual remains of shareholder is less than half team residual remains.     

An Analysis of Principal-Agent of Game under the Asymmetric Information in Venture Capital

The relationship of investors and venture capitalists is an important part in venture capital. Based on asymmetric information, this paper analyzes the principal agent relationship between investors and venture capitalists with game theory. And this paper mainly discusses the choosing, controlling and incentive problem. It suggests that only the capable and self confident venture capitalists could accept the terms of the limited partnership. It also indicates that recompense mechanism which holds the interest of investors and that of venture capitalists tightly is the center of the limited partnership. Rate of yield is the key of recompense mechanism, it not only reflects the incentive on venture capitalists, also reflects the share of risk between investors and venture capitalists. At last, the market credit play an important role in venture capital.     

Analysis of Game on Layoff Mechanism for Human Resource in Enterprise

Under the conditions of shortage of demand on goods, the prices of goods and the economic benefit of enterprise will fall. The enterprise should adjust management and decision-making and some employees whose output values are lower than their wages from the enterprise will be fired. The layoff mechanism from the enterprise can provide an efficient way for these employees to leave voluntarily. As long as the total value of reword outward of the enterprise can exceed their total output values, the layoff mechanism can be put in practice. There is the economic game on the final price for the layoff during the process. In the cases of reaching consistent agreement on it or not between the employees and the enterprise, the results of game such as Nash equilibrium and stratagem are respectively discussed. The degree of uncertainty of the faith on the price from the arbitrator will affect largely the equilibrium when the arbitrator is involved.     

Game of Hospital-tient Relationship Under Asymmetric Information

The hospital and patient are in the state of asymmetric information in the medical market, which could lead to moral hazard, adverse selection, and low market efficiency. By the game model, we analyze the game process and equilibrium between the hospital and patient under the condition of asymmetric information. The analyzing result suggest that asymmetric information in the medical market is harmful to the patient's benefit and the development of the medical market. Therefore, it's necessary to set up medical information opening system and strengthen the communication between the hospital and the patient so as to relieve the asymmetric information between hospital and patient.     

基于博弈模型油脂行业“企业+农户”模式的可行性研究

面对油脂企业原料短缺、农民有豆惜售的局面,传统的“企业挂牌收购、农民送粮”购销模式对油脂行业已呈现出不适应。“企业+农户”模式通过改变油脂行业的产业链结构,使商品市场和原材料市场联动,从源头消除价格风险可望解决上述难题。利用博弈模型分析油脂行业中推广“企业+农户”模式可行性后,结果表明：订单合同中违约金额的设定是制约“企业+农户”模式推广的重要因素,并提出提高订单合同执行率、建立企业和农户的声誉监督机制、重视政府和合作社的作用和运用期货工具等建议来促进油脂行业“企业+农户”模式的发展。     

Revelation Game of the Private Information Under Asymmetric Information

Because of the existence of the private information, the informed trader can make excess payoffs by using the information advantages. And also the informed trader can choose the trade strategies to attain the up most excess payoffs. However, he may lose his information advantages. This paper analyzes the conditions when the informed trader can make use of the private information and its optimal times underlying the framework of the strategic market game.