Virological surveillance and phylogenetic analysis of the PB2 genes of influenza viruses isolated from wild water birds flying from their nesting lakes in Siberia to Hokkaido, Japan in autumn

Recent introduction of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) in wild birds from poultry in Eurasia signaled the possibility that this virus may perpetuate in nature. Surveillance of avian influenza especially in migratory birds, therefore, has been conducted to provide information on the viruses brought by them to Hokkaido, Japan, from their nesting lakes in Siberia in autumn. During 2008-2009, 62 influenza viruses of 21 different combinations of hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) subtypes were isolated. Up to September 2010, no HPAIV has been found, indicating that H5N1 HPAIV has not perpetuated at least dominantly in the lakes where ducks nest in summer in Siberia. The PB2 genes of 54 influenza viruses out of 283 influenza viruses isolated in Hokkaido in 2000-2009 were phylogenetically analysed. None of the genes showed close relation to those of H5N1 HPAIVs that were detected in wild birds found dead in Eurasia on the way back to their northern territory in spring.     

Pathogenicity and transmission of H5N1 avian influenza viruses in different birds

In this study, we selected three H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs), A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (clades 0), A/Duck/Guangdong/E35/2012 (clade 2.3.2.1) and A/Chicken/Henan/B30/2012 (clade 7.2) isolated from different birds in China, to investigate the pathogenicity and transmission of the viruses in terrestrial birds and waterfowl. To observe the replication and shedding of the H5N1 HPAIVs in birds, the chickens were inoculated intranasally with 10⁶ EID₅₀ of GSGD/1/96, 10³ EID₅₀ of DkE35 and CkB30, and the ducks and geese were inoculated intranasally with 10⁶ EID₅₀ of each virus. Meanwhile, the naive contact groups were set up to detect the transmission of the viruses in tested birds. Our results showed that DkE35 was highly pathogenic to chickens and geese, but not fatal to ducks. It could be detected from all the tested organs, oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs, and could transmit to the naive contact birds. GSGD/1/96 could infect chickens, ducks and geese, but only caused death in chickens. It could transmit to the chickens and ducks, but was not transmittable to geese. CkB30 was highly pathogenic to chickens, low pathogenic to ducks and not pathogenic to geese. It could be transmitted to the naive contact chickens, but not to the ducks or geese. Our findings suggested that H5N1 HPAIVs from different birds show different host ranges and tissue tropisms. Therefore, we should enhance serological and virological surveillance of H5N1 HPAIVs, and pay more attention to the pathogenic and antigenic evolution of these viruses.     

Influenza virus surveillance in waterfowl in Pennsylvania after the H5N2 avian outbreak

During the latter stages of the lethal H5N2 influenza eradication program in domestic poultry in Pennsylvania in 1983-84, surveillance of waterfowl was done to determine if these birds harbored influenza viruses that might subsequently appear in poultry. From late June to November 1984, 182 hemagglutinating viruses were isolated from 2043 wild birds, primarily ducks, in the same geographical area as the earlier lethal H5N2 avian influenza outbreak. The virus isolates from waterfowl included paramyxoviruses (PMV-1, -4, and -6) and influenza viruses of 13 antigenic combinations. There was only one H5N2 isolate from a duck. Although this virus was antigenically related to the lethal H5N2 virus, genetic and antigenic analysis indicated that it could be discriminated from the virulent family of H5N2 viruses, and it did not originate from chickens. Many of the influenza viruses obtained from wild ducks were capable of replicating in chickens after experimental inoculation but did not cause disease. These studies show that many influenza A virus strains circulating in waterfowl in the vicinity of domestic poultry in Pennsylvania did not originate from domestic poultry. These influenza viruses from wild ducks were capable of infecting poultry; however, transmission of these viruses to poultry apparently was avoided by good husbandry and control measures.     

水禽用H5亚型禽流感灭活疫苗对高致病性禽流感病毒流行毒株的免疫保护效果研究

为评价水禽用禽流感灭活疫苗(H5N2亚型,D7株)对2010年以后分离的高致病性禽流感病毒流行毒株的免疫保护效果,将该疫苗免疫3周龄SPF鸭后,21 d采血、分离血清测定HI抗体效价,同时用5株2010年以后分离的高致病性禽流感流行毒进行攻毒保护试验,攻毒后5d采集所有试验鸭喉头和泄殖腔拭子进行病毒分离.结果显示,该疫苗免疫SPF鸭21 d后的HI抗体效价的几何平均滴度达7.4log2,对5株高致病性禽流感病毒的攻击均可产生良好的免疫保护,并有效阻止病毒排泄.该疫苗的推广使用将对我国水禽高致病性禽流感的防控发挥重要作用.     

Influenza viruses and paramyxoviruses in ducks in the Atlantic flyway, 1977-1983, including an H5N2 isolate related to the virulent chicken virus

From 1977 to 1983, waterfowl migrating along the Atlantic flyway were annually monitored for orthomyxoviruses and paramyxoviruses in an area in central New York State. A total of 168 influenza isolates were obtained from 1,430 waterfowl. Twenty-four combinations of hemagglutinin and neuraminidase subtypes were detected, with as many as 12 found in a single year. One combination, an H5N2 isolate in 1982, was closely related to the virulent chicken virus that appeared in Pennsylvania in 1983. The prevalence of influenza varied greatly among the common waterfowl species: mallards 42%, black ducks 30%, blue-winged teal 11%, wood ducks 2%, and Canada geese 0%. A total of 89 paramyxoviruses were also from these waterfowl. In contrast to findings with influenza virus, the prevalence of paramyxoviruses did not differ significantly among the duck species. Serotype 1 (Newcastle disease virus) was predominant; three other serotypes were also identified. These findings indicated that ducks in the Atlantic flyway continually harbor influenza viruses and paramyxoviruses. The viruses may be a source of infection for other species.     

Development of vaccine strains of H5 and H7 influenza viruses

To establish vaccine strains of H5 and H7 influenza viruses, A/duck/Hokkaido/Vac-1/04 (H5N1) [Vac-1/04 (H5N1)], A/duck/Hokkaido/Vac-3/07 (H5N1) [Vac-3/07 (H5N1)], and A/duck/Hokkaido/ Vac-2/04 (H7N7) [Vac-2/04 (H7N7)] were generated from non-pathogenic avian influenza viruses isolated from migratory ducks. Vac-1/04 (H5N1) and Vac-3/07 (H5N1) were generated by genetic reassortment between H5N2 or H5N3 virus as an HA gene provider and H7N1 or H6N1 viruses as an NA gene provider. Vac-2/04 (H7N7) was a genetic reassortant obtained using H7N7 and H9 N2 viruses to give high growth character of the H9N2 virus in chicken embryonated eggs. The results of sequence analyses and experimental infections revealed that these H5N1 and H7N7 reassortant viruses were non-pathogenic in chickens and embryos, and had good growth potential in embryonated eggs. These viruses should be useful to develop vaccines against H5 and H7 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses.     

Molecular characterization of an influenza A virus (H4N2) isolated from waterfowl habitats in the State of Mexico

Wild waterfowl and their habitats are the main reservoirs of influenza A virus (IAV) mainly during the breeding season and prior to migration. This study describes the molecular characterization of an IAV isolated from 240 water samples of a small wetland during non-breeding season of migratory wild ducks in the State of Mexico, Mexico. The results showed that the virus belongs to the H4N2 subtype and each of its eight segments of the viral genome has similarity to IAV isolated from ducks in North America. This study suggests that IAV can be isolated from small wetland during non-breeding season of migrating waterfowl.     

Antigenic and genetic analyses of H5 influenza viruses isolated from ducks in Asia.

The hemagglutinin (HA) of six H5 influenza virus strains isolated from ducks in Japan and China in 1976 to 1996 were analyzed antigenically and genetically. Antigenic analysis using a panel of monoclonal antibodies revealed that the HA of H5 influenza viruses isolated from ducks are antigenically closely related to each other. Phylogenetic analysis indicates that the isolates from ducks in Hokkaido were derived from an ancestor common with the highly pathogenic isolates from chickens and humans in Hong Kong in 1997.     

Origin and evolution of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in Asia

Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza caused by H5N1 viruses were reported almost simultaneously in eight neighbouring Asian countries between December 2003 and January 2004, with a ninth reporting in August 2004, suggesting that the viruses had spread recently and rapidly. However, they had been detected widely in the region in domestic waterfowl and terrestrial poultry for several years before this, and the absence of widespread disease in the region before 2003, apart from localised outbreaks in the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region (SAR), is perplexing. Possible explanations include limited virus excretion by domestic waterfowl infected with H5N1, the confusion of avian influenza with other serious endemic diseases, the unsanctioned use of vaccines, and the under-reporting of disease as a result of limited surveillance. There is some evidence that the excretion of the viruses by domestic ducks had increased by early 2004, and there is circumstantial evidence that they can be transmitted by wild birds. The migratory birds from which viruses have been isolated were usually sick or dead, suggesting that they would have had limited potential for carrying the viruses over long distances unless subclinical infections were prevalent. However, there is strong circumstantial evidence that wild birds can become infected from domestic poultry and potentially can exchange viruses when they share the same environment. Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that wild birds have played a more significant role in spreading disease than trade through live bird markets and movement of domestic waterfowl. Asian H5N1 viruses were first detected in domestic geese in southern China in 1996. By 2000, their host range had extended to domestic ducks, which played a key role in the genesis of the 2003/04 outbreaks. The epidemic was not due to the introduction and spread of a single virus but was caused by multiple viruses which were genotypically linked to the Goose/GD/96 lineage via the haemagglutinin gene. The H5N1 viruses isolated from China, including the Hong Kong SAR, between 1999 and 2004 had a range of genotypes and considerable variability within genotypes. The rising incidence and widespread reporting of disease in 2003/04 can probably be attributed to the increasing spread of the viruses from existing reservoirs of infection in domestic waterfowl and live bird markets leading to greater environmental contamination. When countries in the region started to report disease in December 2003, others were alerted to the risk and disease surveillance and reporting improved. The H5N1 viruses have reportedly been eliminated from three of the nine countries that reported disease in 2003/04, but they could be extremely difficult to eradicate from the remaining countries, owing to the existence of populations and, possibly, production and marketing sectors, in which apparently normal birds harbour the viruses.     

The 2009 pandemic (H1N1) viruses isolated from pigs show enhanced pathogenicity in mice

Since the emergence of the 2009 pandemic (H1N1) virus (2009/H1N1) in April 2009, cases of transmission from humans to pigs have been reported frequently. In our previous studies, four 2009/H1N1 variants were isolated from pigs. To better understand the phenotypic differences of the pig isolates compared with the human isolate, in this study mice were inoculated intranasally with different 2009/H1N1 viruses, and monitored for morbidity, mortality, and viral replication, cytokine production and pathological changes in the lungs. The results show that all isolates show effective replication in lungs, but varying in their ability to cause morbidity. In particular, the strains of A/swine/Nanchang/3/2010 (H1N1) and A/swine/Nanchang/F9/2010 (H1N1) show the greatest virulence with a persisting replication in lungs and high lethality for mice, compared with the human isolate A/Liaoning /14/2009 (H1N1), which shows low virulence in mice. Furthermore, the lethal strains could induce more severe lung pathological changes and higher production of cytokines than that of other strains at an early stage. Amino acid sequence analysis illustrates prominent differences in viral surface glycoproteins and polymerase subunits between pig isolates and human strains that might correlate with their phenotypic differences. These studies demonstrate that the 2009/H1N1 pig isolates exhibit heterogeneous infectivity and pathogencity in mice, and some strains possess an enhanced pathogenicity compared with the human isolate.     

H5N1 subtype highly pathogenic avian influenza virus isolated from healthy mallard captured in South Korea

On December 7, 2010, H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus was isolated from a healthy mallard captured at the Mankyung River in South Korea. Phylogenetic analysis showed that this virus was classified into clade 2.3.2 and closely related to H5N1 viruses isolated from wild birds in Mongolia, Russia and China in 2009 and 2010.     

Isolation of influenza A viruses from migratory waterfowl in San-in District, western Japan in the winter of 1983-1984

Certain species of winter migratory waterfowl in San-in District, western Japan, were surveyed for influenza virus from November 1983 to March 1984. Faeces of the waterfowl were collected regularly at five stations. Eleven influenza A viruses including H5N3 and H10N4 subtypes were isolated from 450 faecal samples from whistling swans, 28 viruses including H2N2 and H10N4 subtypes were isolated from 362 faecal samples from pintails; and subtype H13N6 was isolated from 240 faecal samples of black-tailed gulls.     

Influenza A virus surveillance in live-bird markets: first report of influenza A virus subtype H4N6, H4N9, and H10N3 in Thailand

A one-year influenza A survey was conducted in 10 live bird markets (LBMs) in H5N1 high-risk areas in Thailand from January to December 2009. The result from the survey showed that the occurrence of influenza A virus (IAV) in LBMs was 0.36% (19/5304). Three influenza A subtypes recovered from LBMs were H4N6 (n = 2), H4N9 (n = 1), and H10N3 (n = 16) from Muscovy ducks housed in one LBM in Bangkok. These influenza subtypes had never been reported in Thailand, and therefore such genetic diversity raises concern about potential genetic reassortment of the viruses in avian species in a particular setting. Two influenza A subtypes (H4N6 and H4N9) were isolated from oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs of the same duck, suggesting coinfection with two influenza subtypes and possible genetic reassortment in the bird. In addition, H10N3 infection in ducks housed in the same LBM was observed. These findings further support that LBMs are a potential source of IAV transmission and genetic reassortment.     

Lessons from emergence of A/goose/Guangdong/1996-like H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses and recent influenza surveillance efforts in southern China

Southern China is proposed as an influenza epicentre. At least two of the three pandemics in the last century, including 1957 and 1968 influenza pandemics, originated from this area. In 1996, A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (H5N1), the precursor of currently circulating highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) was identified in farmed geese in southern China. These H5N1 HPAIVs have been spread across Asia, Europe and Africa and poses a continuous threat to both animal and human health. However, how and where this H5N1 HPAIV emerged are not fully understood. In the past decade, many influenza surveillance efforts have been carried out in southern China, and our understanding of the genetic diversity of non-human influenza A viruses in this area has been much better than ever. Here, the historical and first-hand experimental data on A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996(H5N1)-like HPAIVs are reviewed within the context of the findings from recent surveillance efforts on H5N1 HPAIVs and other non-human influenza A viruses. Such a retrospective recapitulation suggests that long-term and systematic surveillance programmes should continue to be implemented in southern China that the wet markets on the animal-human interface shall be the priority area and that the surveillance on the animal species bridging the interface between wildlife and domestic animal populations and the interface between the aquatics and territories shall be the strengthened.     

Prior infection with antigenically heterologous low pathogenic avian influenza viruses interferes with the lethality of the H5 highly pathogenic strain in domestic ducks

Low and highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs and HPAIVs, respectively) have been co-circulating in poultry populations in Asian, Middle Eastern, and African countries. In our avian-flu surveillance in Vietnamese domestic ducks, viral genes of LPAIV and HPAIV have been frequently detected in the same individual. To assess the influence of LPAIV on the pathogenicity of H5 HPAIV in domestic ducks, an experimental co-infection study was performed. One-week-old domestic ducks were inoculated intranasally and orally with phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) (control) or 10⁶ EID₅₀ of LPAIVs (A/duck/Vietnam/LBM678/2014 (H6N6) or A/Muscovy duck/Vietnam/LBM694/2014 (H9N2)). Seven days later, these ducks were inoculated with HPAIV (A/Muscovy duck/Vietnam/LBM808/2015 (H5N6)) in the same manner. The respective survival rates were 100% and 50% in ducks pre-infected with LBM694 or LBM678 strains and both higher than the survival of the control group (25%). The virus titers in oral/cloacal swabs of each LPAIV pre-inoculation group were significantly lower at 3–5 days post-HPAIV inoculation. Notably, almost no virus was detected in swabs from surviving individuals of the LBM678 pre-inoculation group. Antigenic cross-reactivity among the viruses was not observed in the neutralization test. These results suggest that pre-infection with LPAIV attenuates the pathogenicity of HPAIV in domestic ducks, which might be explained by innate and/or cell-mediated immunity induced by the initial infection with LPAIV.     

Surveillance and identification of influenza A viruses in wild aquatic birds in the Crimea, Ukraine (2006-2008)

The ecology of avian influenza (AI) viruses in wild aquatic birds of Asia is poorly understood, especially for the H5N1 high pathogenicity AI (HPAI) viruses. From March 2006 through November 2008, 20 AI viruses were isolated in the Crimea region of Ukraine with an overall frequency of virus recovery of 3.3%. All the viruses were isolated from three species of dabbling ducks: mallard (Anas platyrhynchos), wigeon (Anas penelope), and garganey (Anas querquedula), making the frequency of virus recovery for dabbling ducks 6.3%. The viruses were predominantly isolated during the fall sampling period. All viruses were genetically and antigenically characterized. No H5N1 HPAI viruses were isolated, but other HA and NA subtypes were identified including H3N1 (2), H3N6 (3), H3N8 (4), H4N6 (6), H5N2 (3), H7N8 (1), and H10N6 (1) subtypes. All isolates were of low pathogenicity, as determined by the intravenous pathogenicity index of 0.00. For H5N2 and H7N8 isolates, the HA gene was sequenced and the phylogenetic analysis revealed possible ecologic connections of the Crimea region with AI viruses from Siberia and Europe. No influenza A isolates were recovered from other Anseriformes (diving ducks [two species of pochards] and graylag geese), Columbiformes (collared doves), Gruiformes (coot), and Galliformes (gray partridges).