Choice of the Company Management Structure Models in the State-run Assets Reform

Based on the three levels of the company management structure,this paper points out that it is the focal point that every key element of the company's management structure is perfect.What's more,it is difficult point that the(duty) and authority of every key element of the company management structure are determined.Based on that,the(authors) put forward the division of authority and responsibility,and probed into three kinds of the administration modes in the state-run assets reform.     

An Analysis of ESO and Manager Behavior by Game Theory

After reform of state -owned firms mechanism, many companies appeal for ESO, but there have not been any clear theories for operation in practice until now. On the basis of principal-agent theory of the firm, this paper regards owners and managers as the two sides to game and builds the game model which analyses the behaviors of owners and managers. As a long-term stock based incentive system, ESO will align the goal of owners and managers and make them reach Nash Equilibrium to maximize their utility, and lower agency cost to solve the agency problem in modern firms.     

The Study on the Shot and Long Term of Tactics to Perfect Independent Directors` System

The independent directors` system is regarded as a kind of way to perfect company's administration structure, China Securities Regulatory Commission introduces it into the listed company managing, and offer the great expectations. But the effect of the independent directors` system is not very good. So the game theory is used in this text. The game frame between independent directors and listed company administrative authority is structured and a short time of perfecting independent director's system and long-term tactics to factor influencing independent directors` system are educed through discussing the influence factors one by one.     

Optimizing Capital Structure of Enterprises by Multiobjective Programming Model

This paper puts forward that capital structure is affected by cost of capital?risk?the agin ability? and the ability of capital value preserved and added, several factors, of and at the same time the authors analyzes them by approaching the limitation of regarding the weighted average cost of capital as the optimal standard of capital structure in the traditional capital structure decision-making method. Therefore multiobjective-programming method is applied in the capital structure to establish the target function and its subjection equations. Furthermore , this article shows its application.     

Analysis on the Game of Supervision on the Listed Company''s Administrator

When studying on the supervision on listed company performance manipulation, the administrator's role has been emphasized increasingly. By setting up a game model, the article analyzes the performance manipulation made by the listed company's administrator. The analysis shows that the optimal performance manipulation strategy taken by the administrator is determined by the profits obtained by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the prior probability of the listed company performance categories made by CSRC, while the optimal supervision strategy taken by CSRC is determined by the final profits of the listed company. Thus, it is obvious that there is a mutual guessing and influencing relationship between the listed company's administrator and CSRC. Finally, the game model constructed is further analyzed by employing it in the real cases.     

Compensation trust evaluation model of grid service

It is difficult to distinguish the cheating and other malicious behaviours in the grid service trust evaluation. A trust evaluation model for grid service based on compensation is proposed.With market mechanism, service provider and demander present the expected profit and compensate price for their behaviours to maximize their own profit. The game theory is applied to balance the expected profit and compensate price. Based on the game theory, evaluation trade strategy achieves perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Service provider and demander can choose their own trade strategy to maximize profit. Theoretical analysis and simulation results show that the service demanders can abandon the cheating motivation voluntarily, while the service providers can make right decision to choose trust evaluation. Compared with the existing model, the precision and security of the trust evaluation is enhanced greatly, while the calculating and communication cost is reduced remarkably.     

Concrete Evidence Reseach to the Aacepting Insurance Ability of China''s Non-life Insurance Companies

Owning to the ability of accepting insurance enough,it is the foundation for insurance companies to operate in a long-term and steady way,a method to develop sustainably,a reflection of an insurance company's comprehensive competition ability and also a premise for an insurance company to realize developing strategy.Accepting insurance ability is very important in the development and strategic planning for an insurance company.The quantitative analysis is used to analyze the ability of accepting insurance of our country's insurance companies,in another word,the factor(analysis),which belongs to the analysis of diverse statistic,is used.Using the method to give a concrete evidence analysis to the ability of accepting insurance of our country's non-life insurance companies,so that the insurance companies can understand very well to the advantages and disadvantages of the ability of accepting insurance to each other,and as well as supplying a strategic reference for the insurance companies themselves to make decisive planning.     

Dilemma and Choice: Consideration of the Real- estate Guaranty Company in China

With the implementation of the policy for house monetarization,the real-estate guaranty company develops quickly in our country.However,there exist many problems as it is a newly emerged thing in financial system of real estate.The problems are as follows: the estate security company is defined as a medium agency in legislature,which does not conform to its feature as financial business;the local restrictions will cause the decrease of credit,weakness in risk-taking capacity and supervision of the company.Such predicament hinders the development of the guaranty company seriously.In order to resolve these problems, the crucial way is to clarify the status of the guaranty company as a non-bank financial institution,and to set up a national guaranty company to offer official security to the people of low income and enhance internal and external supervision.Only through these steps can we realize the functions of the guaranty company for real estate and give full play of its potential function.     

上市公司股权结构对业绩影响的实证研究——基于制造业公司的经验数据

股权结构研究是公司治理结构研究中的核心问题。选取制造业上市公司2010—2012年3年间数据作为研究样本,以股权结构特征作为解释变量,通过主成分因子分析法构建公司业绩指标,同时以公司规模和年度作为相关控制变量。在创建多元线性回归模型的基础上,对国内上市制造企业当前的股权结构、绩效关系等进行了详细的实证研究,对实证结果提出了政策建议,为股权结构对业绩影响的研究提供参考。     

对构建企业高层与员工互信机制的思考

用系统管理理论,说明系统内的各个分系统和子系统的内在矛盾性对系统存在的制约。在企业内部构建管理高层和员工的互信机制对提高企业效率和减少内耗具有重大的意义。对互信机制主要的影响因素进行分析,并针对企业高层和员工之间缺乏互信机制产生的问题提出了对策。     

云南农业信息化服务三农新模式

为解决农业信息传播“进村入户,最后一公里”的问题,推动农业、农村信息化服务“三农”,云南省农业科学院与新华社云南分社和中国移动云南分公司紧密合作,共同搭建了“云南农村信息化扶贫暨农信通专家咨询服务平台”。本研究主要介绍了平台的建设现状、服务内容、功能模块、实施方案和取得的成果,提出在农村信息化体系建设过程中要选择低成本的信息化模式,走低成本和本土化的农村信息化道路;建立健全农信通专家服务长效运行机制,增强可持续发展能力;完善“农信通”服务功能模式,构建基于移动数字图书馆的云南本土化移动信息服务集成;加强服务体系建设,形成完备的农业科技服务支持体系,以产业化方式推进农业信息化发展。     

Strategy of Customer Knowledge Management Base on Lifetime

The same CRM solution in same industry results in service assimilation among businesses, the cost of customer retention are rising, such strategy can not serve the purpose of saving customer cost for companies. This article introduces the new CRM solution- CKM, then analyzes the information from customer to company through the process that company dealing with consumer, and proposes a solution of the five styles CKM.     

The Evaluating Model of the BSC in the Audit of the Capacity of Sustainable Operation

With the increasingly economic competition in the World, the audit industry, numerous investors and the enterprises pay more and more attention on the audit of company's sustainable operation. In view of existing situation that the audit on the capacity of sustainable operation attach main importance to the finance of the audited company, in the result, it is difficult to recognize it completely. The model of the balanced scorecard is used, an indicator system that combine company's finance condition and non-finance condition is built in the sustainable operation audit. Basing on the way to process non-dimensional quantities of indicators, the audit use the analytic hierarchy process to determine the weights of the evaluating indicators and take the degree of gray incidence as the evaluation criteria.     

Analysis of the Impact of Ownership Structure on the External Corporate Governance

Taking-over market, the main component of external corporate governance, affects the performance of corporate governance significantly. Through taking-over activities between companies, the market assumes its role in the governance mechanism. This paper analyzes the taking-over market of listed company in China from the view of ownership structure. By looking into the indirect taking-over activities between companies, the authors research the impact of specific ownership structure on the effectiveness of external corporate governance deriving from such activities. It is concluded that innovation of ownership structure is the key for taking-over market to take its role in external corporate governance more effectively.     

An Empirical Research on the Relationship Between the Manager Pay and Firm Performance of Chinese Public Companies

This paper introduces the theory and research result on the manager pay. The mutual effect between manager pay firm performance is analyzed, and the managerial shareholding has no significant effect on firm performance, but the managerial annual pay has significant positive effect on the firm performance in Chinese public companies. It is found that the board structure and the owner nature have different effect to the style of manager payment. Finally, we put forward some feasible suggestion of buillding up a set of payment mechanism for Chinese public companies.     

Application of Game Theory to the Construction Corporation Management

Based on the introduction of particularity of the construction project and asymmetric information in its implementation, it shows that the project manager may have opportunism behavior, which affects the construction corporation and project manager. A principal-agent theory is applied to set up two models under different risk attitude and which proved that only if the agent were risk-neutral, the principal would get the maximum profit by leasing the project. The opportunism behavior does appear in the optimal incentive mechanism when the agent is risk-avoiding and it is harmful to the principal's benefit. The fundamental way to eliminate opportunism is enhancing the incentive intensity and enforcing outside monitoring and binding mechanism.     

A Game Theory Model on the Information Screen Effect of Compose of Option and Probation Period Mechanism

We have put forward a theory that the probation period mechanism have an information screening function when a company is inviting applications for job, which would be a supplement for the spence model. One of the merits of the model is that it could screen the informations of employee's capacity when there are fewer differences between the capacities of employees. This paper also has proved that option mechanism has a information screening effect and the compose of option and probation period mechanism could decrease the screen cost of a company. We have derived the mathematical Principles of probation period mechanism and the compose of option and probation period mechanism design in the paper.     

Comparatively Research of Methods of Electricity Pricing at Transitional Period in China

With the reform toward power market processing, how to decide electricity price becomes a key problem which one power plant have to face. So in this paper, the authors show two ways to the problem, a pricing model by account and a pricing model by economics, then they analyze the cost structure and counting principle of three-electricity price, which is determined by the methods of repayment of capital with interest (RCI pricing), of the operation period (OP pricing) and of marginal cost (MC pricing). Then similarities and differences among these three pricing methods existing in the transitional period are examined by a case in china. The indicate that it is important and inevitable to reform RCI pricing, to popularize OP pricing and to transfer to MC pricing.     

Study on Principal -agent Relationship between Developers and Agents

With the development of real estate market,the agency model will be more popular.Under asymmetry of information,both developer and agent are faced with moral hazards.In this paper,the authors analyzed the Principal-agent relationship between developers and agents,and used a principal-agent model to analyze the influencing factors for agent's moral hazards,and the influencing factors for developer's moral hazards,at last,the authors provided some ideas to solve this problem.     

风险视角下的动态信任关系模型

对风险问题的准确把握,是保证信任决策科学性的关键。针对目前在动态信任关系研究中对信任与风险本质关系理解不够和研究的不足,提出了风险视角下的信任关系理论模型和决策模型,详细分析并给出了信任与风险,以及信任决策与风险决策的本质关系,认为信任是风险的另一种表达形式,信任决策就是风险决策。通过对信任、风险和可信决策三者为一体的安全决策过程的分析,增强了安全决策的科学性,使得安全决策更加理性、全面和客观。